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The paper investigates the conflict that arises between the government, its 
bureaucrats and businesses in the tax collection process. We examine the effect of 
fiscal policy and corruption control mechanisms on the prevalence of tax evasion 
and corruption behaviour, and their impact on firm growth and social welfare. We 
first model a situation where bureaucrats are homogeneous and have complete 
negotiating power over the firms with which they interact. We show that in such a 
situation the government can set an optimal tax rate and put in place a corruption 
control mechanism involving detection of corrupt bureaucrats within the framework 
of a no-corruption equilibrium. However, when the public administration is 
composed of heterogeneous types of bureaucrats with the specific ability to impose 
red tape costs on firms, we show, like Acemoglu and Verdier (2000), that it might be 
best for the government to allow a certain level of corruption, given the cost of 
monitoring activities. We also show that the government could face lose-lose as well 
as win-win situations in the conduct of its fiscal policies. We then verify the 
predictions of the model using firm-level data collected from 243 businesses in 
Uganda. We test the effect of monitoring on bribe and tax payments. We also test 
the effect of tax rates and corruption control mechanisms on firm growth. We 
compare the effect of actual corruption (as measured by bribe payments) with the 
effect of government corruption expectations on firms’ growth. 
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Corruption tends to distort the allocation of resources and slow down 
economic growth. Cross-country studies have shown that corruption can explain 
slower growth in developing countries through lower investment levels, higher 
bureaucratic control and institutional constraints (Mauro, 1995; Tanzi, 2002). 
Corruption has even been seen as an integral part of government activities often 
specifically devised to extract higher bribes (Bardham, 1997; Kauffman, 2001; 
Svensson, 2003). 
 
As emphasized by Shleifer and Vishny (1993), bribe payments to public 
officials lead to inequities and inefficiencies in tax administration, since they result in 
a transfer of public resources to private agents, thus reducing government 
revenues. They also constitute a major impediment to equitable and efficient tax 
administration, placing firms that do not engage in such practices at a competitive 
disadvantage. (Gauthier and Reinikka, 2001; Tanzi and Davoodi, 2002). 
 
Various models have been proposed to examine the effect of bureaucratic 
corruption. In the context of tax collection activities, Basu, Bhattacharya and Mishra 
(1992) considered the effect of corruption control mechanisms such as penalties, 
and the probability of detection of corrupt agents within public hierarchies. Besley 
and McLaren (1993) studied the use of optimal remuneration schemes in reducing 
corruption. Based on general equilibrium models, Acemoglu and Verdier (1998, 
2000) examined the appearance of corruption in government regulatory activities in 
the context of imperfect propriety right enforcement. They noted that corruption The Effect of Fiscal Policy and Corruption Control Mechanisms on 
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arises as part of an optimal allocation of government activities where there are 
incomplete contracts and incentive problems. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between tax levels 
and corruption activities. We develop a simple model to analyze the conflict 
between a government, bureaucrats and private firms in the context of the tax 
collection process. To finance its activities, the government needs to levy taxes on 
private firms. This requires the use of agents (bureaucrats) to obtain information on 
business activities and collect taxes. These bureaucrats are self-interested and, 
given their superior information, are difficult to monitor. In addition, they often 
possess discretionary power over firms. A bureaucrat could, for instance, choose to 
enforce tax rules or other regulations stringently, but could also threaten to impose 
penalties or delay the delivery of public services (licenses, permits, etc.) if the firm 
does not produce a bribe.
1 In such situations, side payments are likely to take place 
between firms and bureaucrats. 
 
We focus in this paper on one corruption control mechanism in particular, 
namely the detection of corrupt employees through monitoring activities. We first 
model a situation where bureaucrats are homogeneous and have complete 
negotiating power over the firms with which they interact. We show that in such a 
situation the government can set an optimal tax rate and put in place a corruption 
control mechanism involving detection within the framework of a no-corruption 
equilibrium. 
 
However, when the public administration is composed of heterogeneous 
types of bureaucrats with the specific ability to impose red tape costs on firms, we 
show, like Acemoglu and Verdier (2000), that it might be best for the government to 
allow a certain level of corruption, given the cost of monitoring activities. We show in 
particular that net government revenues are maximized under a fiscal regime with 
some level of corruption activity. Where there are heterogeneous bureaucrats, 
social costs and firm costs might also be reduced under a fiscal regime with 
corruption at equilibrium. The Effect of Fiscal Policy and Corruption Control Mechanisms on 
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Furthermore, we show that the government could be placed in a lose-lose 
situation where an overly high tax rate is conducive to high costs imposed on firms 
through bribery and overly low tax revenues. For a certain level of tax enforcement 
and monitoring activities, reducing tax rates could bring about a win-win situation in 
which net costs to firms are reduced and tax revenues increase. 
 
Using firm-level data from the Ugandan enterprise survey organized by the 
World Bank, we investigate the effect of monitoring activities and firm bargaining 
power on bribe payments and tax revenues. We also test for the relationship 
between corruption, tax levels and firm growth. We find that bribery activities tend to 
significantly reduce tax revenues and that detection mechanisms have significant 
effects on bribe and tax payments. We also find that a myopic government that does 
not take into account the actual importance of bribery activities would underestimate 
the negative impact of corruption on firm growth as bribe payments prove to have an 
even stronger negative effect on firms’ growth than taxes. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 1, we develop the basic 
theoretical model with homogeneous bureaucrats. In section 2, heterogeneity in 
bureaucrat types is introduced. In section 3, we account for shared bargaining 
power between firms and public employees. In section 4, the empirical strategy, 
data sources and empirical results are presented. Section 5 concludes. 
 
1. THE BASIC MODEL 
 
We consider the conflict between a government, a public agent (a 
bureaucrat) and a private firm within the framework of the tax collection process. 
The government seeks to maximize the revenues it derives from taxes levied on 
private firms’ profits. The government has to hire bureaucrats to look at firms’ 
profits, which are not observed directly by the government, and collect taxes based 
on those profits. Bureaucrats, through red tape and other discretionary behaviors, 
are able to impose costs on firms during the tax collection process. In order to 
                                                                                                                                                                    
1 For a discussion and examples of bureaucrats’ discretionary power over the private sector, The Effect of Fiscal Policy and Corruption Control Mechanisms on 
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reduce red tape costs and avoid their tax obligations, firms could bribe bureaucrats. 
A bureaucrat who is caught receiving a bribe with probability p loses all his income. 
If not caught with probability 1-p, he receives his wage and the bribe. 
 
In this environment, we focus on the government’s use of one mechanism in 
particular to reduce the occurrence of corruption within its bureaucracy, namely 
monitoring activities to detect corrupt bureaucrats. 
 
The sequence of the game is as follows. In stage 1, the government 
announces tax rate τ, public wage w and the probability of detecting corrupt 
bureaucrats p. In the second stage, the bureaucrat and the firm look at the firm’s 
profits V as well as the red tape cost c that could be imposed on the firm by the 
bureaucrat, and negotiate the tax amount T and bribe payment B, if any. 
  
To begin, we assume that bureaucrats are homogenous and could all 
impose a red tape cost c on the firm. As the last mover, the firm will choose to pay a 
bribe and, in doing so, evade its tax obligations (T=τ V) if its profits net of the bribe 
are greater than its profits net of its tax obligations and the red tape cost imposed by 
the bureaucrat, as in: 
 
(1a)  ( ) ( ) c T V B V − − ≥ −  
 
That is, the firm will pay the bribe if the bribe amount is smaller than its tax 
obligations plus the red tape cost.
2 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
see for instance Tanzi (1998). 
2 In a situation where the firm can be audited by another public employee after the bribe and 
tax payment negotiation, we can include a fine, A, in our constraint without changing our 
main findings. In such a case, the fine would reduce the amount of the bribe, b, paid so that 
 could simply be c T b A + ≤ + c T B + ≤ . We could also consider the case where a 
firm has to pay a fine plus its tax obligations when caught and thus weighs the benefits of 
being corrupt against those of being honest. In such a case, the firm’s constraint becomes: 
. However, we focus on the simplest case where only the 
bureaucrat is penalized when evasion is discovered. We also note from firm constraint (1a) 
that firms will agree to bear some red tape cost before choosing to pay a bribe. 
c T p B p A T + ≤ − + + ) 1 ( ) ( ) (The Effect of Fiscal Policy and Corruption Control Mechanisms on 
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(1b)  c T B + ≤  
 
The bureaucrat will be corrupt if his expected revenue from accepting a bribe 
is greater than his wage. Given that a corrupt official gets (w + B) with probability 
(1–p) or is caught with probability p and loses all his income, a typical tax collector 
will accept a bribe if:
3 
 











For a bureaucrat to become corrupt, the expected bribe amount has to be 
greater than the expected loss of salary if the bureaucrat is caught. Taking into 
account the firm’s incentive, the problem of the bureaucrat is then to maximize the 













Subject to:  c T B + ≤  
 
Given the incentives faced by bureaucrats and private firms, and combining 
(1b) and (2b), a government that wishes to avoid corruption faces the following 
constraint set: 
(3)  () w p
p c T − ≤ + 1
 
 
This indicates that a bureaucrat remains honest if the firm’s tax payment plus 
red tape cost are smaller than the bureaucrat’s opportunity cost. A government that 
does not want to see its tax revenues dissipated through corruption activities must 
                                                           
3 This constraint is very similar to constraint (1) in Acemoglu and Verdier (1998). However, 
the wage considered here is defined as the net wage, that is, gross wage minus taxes paid 
by the public employee. The Effect of Fiscal Policy and Corruption Control Mechanisms on 
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set the tax rateτ, public sector wage w and probability of detection p so that 
equation (3) holds. 
 
If we denote the government costs of monitoring corruption activities by 
ψ(p)=αp, where α > 0, we can more formally write the revenue-maximizing problem 
of the government as: 
 
( ) p T
p ψ − max  









Solving for the government optimization problem, we consider the case 
where, for a given tax rateτ, public wage w and red tape cost c, the government 
maximizes its revenues by varying the probability of detection p. 
 
Keeping public wage constant, the government can maximize tax revenues 
and avoid corruption by adjusting its level of monitoring activities to detect 




) 1 ( ) 1 (
2 = −
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− − − α
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p w p w
 














w p − =  
 
Equation (4) is represented diagrammatically in Figure 1. It shows that the 
optimal probability of detection decreases with an increase in public wages. Indeed, 
the opportunity cost of a bureaucrat losing his job if caught taking bribes increases 
with the wage level and/or the probability of detecting corrupt officials, each 
corruption control mechanism decreasing when the other increases. 
 The Effect of Fiscal Policy and Corruption Control Mechanisms on 
Firm Growth and Social Welfare: Theory and Evidence 
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FIGURE 1: PROBABILITY OF DETECTION VERSUS PUBLIC WAGES 
 
w  0  α 
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These results could be interpreted in light of corruption control theory 
through tax rates, incentive wages and monitoring activities (Basu et al., 1992; 
Besley and Mclaren, 1993). Equation (3), the government constraint set, allows us 
to represent diagrammatically the relationship between the probability of detection 
of corruption bureaucrat control p, incentive wages w, tax rate τ and bribe amounts 
B. The first quadrant in Figure 2 shows the firm’s constraint B= T + c, or the bribe’s 
offer curve. This curve corresponds to the maximum amount of bribe a firm is willing 
to pay at different tax rates and given the discretionary costs imposed by the public 
official  c. In the second quadrant, the bureaucrat’s constraint is represented 
B = wp/(1-p). It corresponds to the bureaucrat’s opportunity cost and can also be 
seen as the minimum amount of bribe an employee will accept given the probability 
of detection p and wage w, that is, the bureaucrat’s demand for bribes. 
 The Effect of Fiscal Policy and Corruption Control Mechanisms on 
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FIGURE 2: BUREAUCRAT DEMAND AND FIRM OFFER OF BRIBES 
 
 

















B = w2p/(1- p) 
0 
c 
B = T + c 




p1  p 
 
Using Figure 2, we can examine the effects of the variation of these 
parameters at equilibrium. We observe that for any tax rate, for instanceτ2, there is a 
corresponding equilibrium probability p2 and a wage w that generate demand for a 
bribe amount B2. All other things being equal, any detection probability p lower than 
p2 does not maximize government revenues since the bribe amount that a firm is 
willing to offer is greater than the bureaucrat’s opportunity cost. Such a situation is 
represented by tax rate τ2, wage w and the probability of detection p1 (instead of a 
p2) in Figure 2. In such a case, corruption would take place in the segment AB. Note 
that in such a situation, the minimum bribe a bureaucrat is willing to accept is B1, 
while a firm is willing to pay any amount up to B2 to avoid its tax obligations and red 
tape cost c.  
 
These results could help shed light on how a government should set its 
optimal tax rate with regard to the corruption control mechanism it puts forward 
through monitoring activities. Suppose the government wants to increase tax 
revenues by increasing the tax rate from τ1 toτ2, but does not adjust p optimally. This The Effect of Fiscal Policy and Corruption Control Mechanisms on 
Firm Growth and Social Welfare: Theory and Evidence 
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creates room for corruption. Indeed, before the tax increase (i.e. at the equilibrium 
defined by τ1, p1, w and B1), tax revenues are given by the area 0Ap1 in Figure 2.
4 
After the tax rate is increased from τ1 toτ2, while p1 is left unchanged, government 
revenues are still equal to the area 0Ap1. This is because the increase in tax 
revenues sought by the government (area p1ACp2) is captured in bribe payments by 
corrupt bureaucrats. To maximize tax revenues, the government would need to 
increase the probability of detection from p1 to p2 concurrently with the tax hike. This 
would allow re-establishment of a no-corruption equilibrium. For instance, in the 
case where probability of detection increases from p1 to p2, the government would 




It can also be noted, using Figure 2, that even with an infinite salary and an 
infinitesimally small probability of detection (i.e. when the bureaucrat’s bribe 
demand curve B=wp/(1 – p) merges with the vertical axis), bribery at equilibrium will 
always exist. This corroborates the stylized fact of Besley and McLaren (1993) that 
extremely high wages are required to bring corruption down to a minimum level. 
 
In this simple model, we have considered a situation where bureaucrats are 
seen as homogeneous. In the next section, we examine the situation where the 
public administration is composed of heterogeneous bureaucrats. 
 
2. MODEL WITH TWO TYPES OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS 
 
Like Besley and McLaren (1993) and Acemoglu and Verdier (2000), we now 
account for heterogeneity among public officials. Some bureaucrats can be seen as 
having a better capacity than others to extract bribes, due for instance to their 
strategic position in the administration or their specific capacity to impose red tape. 
                                                           
4 Area 0Ap1 includes red tape cost. For simplicity, we assume that this cost is constant and 
that tax revenues and bribe amounts differ only by this constant. 
5 The same would be true if we were to analyze the situation with incentive wages where, for 
example, we increased w to w2 which would make bureaucrats’ constraint B = pw/(1 – p) go 
from the origin, through point B and onwards (dotted line on Figure 2).  Transfers would then 
be in the form of taxes and would correspond to area 0Bp1. Both corrections are equivalent 
and yield the same revenues. The Effect of Fiscal Policy and Corruption Control Mechanisms on 
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Some bureaucrats, for example those in the customs agency, are in a position to 
impose more delays and other costly impediments on a firm’s imports, or to engage 
in other bureaucratic activities (licences, permits, etc.). We assume that this 
difference in bribe-taking capacity among bureaucrats is exogenous.
6 
 
Let us assume that there are two types of bureaucrats and that a firm is 
matched with one type of bureaucrat. Type 1 bureaucrats are able to impose red 
tape cost c1, while type 2 bureaucrats are able to impose cost c2 on the firm. The 
cost that type1 bureaucrats are able to impose is therefore greater than that of 
type 2 (i.e. c1> c2). Further, let us assume that the proportion of type1 bureaucrats in 
the administration is π1, while that of type 2 is (1- π1). We also assume that these 
costs and proportions are common knowledge among players. 
 
In order to characterize the solution to the government problem, we first 
determine the optimal tax rate the government would choose faced with each type 
of bureaucrat. These tax rates are a function of the wage level w, the probability of 
detection p and the red tape cost imposed by the bureaucrat ci, where i = 1,2. For 
each type of bureaucrat, the optimal tax rates are obtained from the government’s 





















≤ τ  
 
As before, assuming that public wage w is identical for both types of 
bureaucrat but that the probability of detection p could vary, we can determine the 
optimal probability of detection associated with each bureaucrat’s type for each 
policy: 
 





w p − =  
                                                           
6 This difference could be endogenized without changes in the results. The Effect of Fiscal Policy and Corruption Control Mechanisms on 
Firm Growth and Social Welfare: Theory and Evidence 
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⎛ − − =
α
π w p  
 
Given equations (3a), (3b), (4a) and (4b) and that c1> c2, then τ1< τ2. That is, 
the optimal tax rate needs to be set at a lower level in a public administration 
composed of type 1 bureaucrats than in an administration composed of type 2 
bureaucrats.
7 Also, when a government is seeking identical gross revenues (without 
considering cost of detection) from either type 1 or type 2 bureaucrats, meaning 
T1=T2, type 1 bureaucrats in the administration have to be monitored with higher 
intensity than type 2 bureaucrats, then p1>p2. For this purpose, we assume that the 
government chooses between two fiscal policies (τ1,  p1) or (τ2,  p2), each 
characterized by a tax rateτ  and its corresponding optimal level of detection of 
corrupt officials p. 
 
Before determining the optimal policy in terms of net tax revenues, let us first 
compare these two policies in terms of government gross  revenues (without 
considering the costs of detection) when the government sets a single tax rate in the 
context of an administration composed of heterogeneous bureaucrats. If the 
government sets the tax rate at τ1 (andτ1< τ2), tax revenues are collected by both 
type 1 and type 2 bureaucrats and are equal to T1. By setting such a tax rate where 
τ1<τ2, the government loses revenues (T2  -  T1)(1 - π1) which could have been 
collected by type 2 bureaucrats if the tax rate had been set at τ2 (see Table 1). In 
turn, if the government sets the tax rate at the higher level τ2, tax revenues are T2 (1-
π1) but are only collected by type 2 bureaucrats. Indeed, all transfers collected by 
type 1 bureaucrats, T1 π1, take the form of bribe payments. This can be understood 
as follows: under the higher tax rate τ2, the opportunity cost (determined by p2) is 
too small to provide incentives to type 1 bureaucrats to be honest. Furthermore, 
                                                           



















2 1 c c − 〈 − ⇔  
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firms dealing with these bureaucrats will prefer to pay any bribe amounts smaller 
than T2 + c1 instead of paying their fiscal obligations and red tape costs.
8 Under a tax 
policy (τ1,  p1) there would then be no corruption at equilibrium, while corruption 
would be observed under policy (τ2, p2) at equilibrium. Based on this observation, 
from now on fiscal policy (τ1, p1) will be referred to as the no-corruption regime 
whereas fiscal policy (τ2, p2) will be referred to as the flexible regime.  
 
Note that, under the no-corruption regime with tax rate τ1, the corresponding 
optimal detection level p1 is such that the bureaucrats’ opportunity costs are very 
high and they have no incentive to be corrupt. However, under such a no-corruption 
regime, the government’s corruption control costs are higher and its tax revenues 
lower than under the flexible regime. Indeed, under the flexible regime, despite the 
fact that some revenues are lost through corruption, tax revenues are higher since 
τ2>τ1, and detection costs are lower since p2< p1. 
 
TABLE 1: GROSS TAX REVENUES UNDER THE NO-CORRUPTION 





Tax rate: τ1 
Policy 2 
Flexible regime 
Tax rate: τ2 
Revenues collected by 
type 1 bureaucrats 
T1 π1  0 
Revenues collected by 
type 2 bureaucrats 
T1 (1 - π1) T 2 (1 - π1) 
Revenues lost  (T2 – T1)(1 - π1)  T1  π1 
Gross tax revenues   T1  T2 ( 1 - π1) 
 
Proceeding as we did for gross revenues, we compare these two fiscal 
regimes in terms of government net tax revenues (net of detection costs) to assess 
which regime yields higher social and firm costs. We define social costs as the sum 
of the costs imposed on firms by tax officials plus the government’s costs to detect 
corrupt employees. Firm costs are defined as the sum of taxes paid by firms plus 
                                                           
8 Fiscal obligations and costs paid to type 1 bureaucrats under the regime with tax rate τ2, 
equivalent to T2 + c1, are obviously greater than obligations paid to type 2 bureaucrats, which The Effect of Fiscal Policy and Corruption Control Mechanisms on 
Firm Growth and Social Welfare: Theory and Evidence 
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the red tape costs imposed by corrupt bureaucrats and bribe amounts. To evaluate 
these costs, we first determine the proportion of type 1 bureaucrats, π1
*, that will be 
corrupt at equilibrium. Comparing social costs and firm costs under each regime 
leads to the following two propositions (proof in the Appendix): 
 
PROPOSITION 1: Where there are heterogeneous types of bureaucrats with 
different discretionary powers, we find corruption at equilibrium if public wage is 
fixed, the probability of detection p varies and the proportion of type 1 bureaucrats 
satisfies:    () () 2
2 1
2








c w w c w w w
x
+









c w w c w w w
x
+





PROPOSITION 2: Social costs are lower under a flexible regime with some 
corruption at equilibrium than under a no-corruption regime. 
 
Proposition 2 suggests that the costs imposed on firms are higher under the 
flexible regime. Hence, while the flexible regime yields higher net tax revenues and 
lower social costs than the no-corruption regime, the costs imposed on firms are 
greater under the flexible regime than under the no-corruption regime. Under the 
flexible regime, corrupt firms pay bribes equal to T2+c1 to type 1 bureaucrats, while 
honest firms pay higher tax transfers (i.e. τ2 > τ1). 
 
3. MODEL WITH BARGAINING POWER 
 
Up to now, we have considered the case where firms have no bargaining 
power in their relationship with public officials. In such situations, bureaucrats are 
able to extract the entire surplus arising from this interaction. In this section, we 
                                                                                                                                                                    
are equivalent to T2 + c2 since c1 > c2. The Effect of Fiscal Policy and Corruption Control Mechanisms on 
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examine the effects of firms possessing some bargaining power in their dealings 
with public officials. 
 
  The sequence of events remains the same as before. The only difference is 
that we now assume the sharing of the bargaining power between firms and 
bureaucrats. We denote the bargaining power of firms by η and that of bureaucrats 
by (1-η). 
 
If we assume that in their negotiation process bureaucrats and firms act 



















w p B B c T
B  








1 2 c T B + ≤  
 
The first term in this optimization problem corresponds to the firm’s objective, 
which is to minimize its bribe payment relative to its fiscal obligations and red tape 
costs. The second term corresponds to the bureaucrat’s objective, which is to 
maximize the bribe received relative to the opportunity cost.
9 Using a generalized 
Nash solution, we obtain the following from the first-order conditions (proof in the 
Appendix): 






w p B + − +
−
= η η  
                                                           
9 This is very similar to the maximization problem considered in part A, the only difference 
being that η = 0 and firms could not reduce their bribe amounts through negotiations. The Effect of Fiscal Policy and Corruption Control Mechanisms on 
Firm Growth and Social Welfare: Theory and Evidence 
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FIGURE 3: BRIBE AMOUNTS VERSUS BARGAINING POWER 
 
 
η  0 
T2 + c1 
1 


















Equation (5) is represented diagrammatically in Figure 3. On the horizontal 
axis lies firm bargaining power and on the vertical axis lies bribe amounts. We see 
that when firms have no bargaining power (η = 0), they pay a bribe equivalent to 
their tax obligations T2 plus the red tape costs c1. When firms’ bargaining power 
increases, the amount of bribe decreases. When firms have complete negotiating 
power (η = 1) they pay a bribe equivalent to the bureaucrat’s opportunity cost. This 
leads to the following proposition: 
 
PROPOSITION 3: Under a flexible fiscal regime allowing for some corruption at 
equilibrium, firms with bargaining power are able to reduce their bribe payments. 
 
Proof: We can examine in diagram form the effects of firms’ bargaining power on 
the equilibrium between w, τ and p and on bribe amounts. Figure 2 shows the case 
where the government has set a tax rate τ2, a probability of detection p1 and a public 
wage w, which together determine the opportunity cost for bureaucrats given by B = 
wp/(1- p)) and firms’ bribe offer curve, B=T+c. This policy choice creates the 
opportunity for corruption as the minimum bribe a bureaucrat would accept is equal 
to B1, while firms are willing to pay any level of bribe up to B2. Without bargaining 
power (as in section 1), a typical firm would pay a bribe amount B2. When the firm The Effect of Fiscal Policy and Corruption Control Mechanisms on 
Firm Growth and Social Welfare: Theory and Evidence 
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has some bargaining power, the bribe amount will be in the range of AB and will 
tend toward the bureaucrat’s opportunity cost A as the firm’s negotiating power 
increases.  
 
Note that as the probability of detection increases, the number of corrupt 
bureaucrats tends to decrease but, for the remaining corrupt bureaucrats, bribe 
amounts will increase in line with their opportunity costs. The aggregate bribe 
payments under low or high detection levels could then be equal. This corroborates 
the stylized fact of Basu, Bhattacharya and Mishra (1992): a rise in sanctions 
increases the opportunity cost of a corrupt employee, who will then ask for larger 
bribes. 
 
If we now examine the effect of negotiating power on firm costs, we see that 
the costs imposed on firms under the no-corruption regime (FCsc) are: 
 
( ) ( )( ) 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 c T c T FCsc + − + + = π π  
 
Under a flexible regime (FCc), the costs imposed on firms are: 
() () () () ( 2 2 1
2
2

















+ + − = π η η π )  
If we compare these costs, we can verify the assumption that the costs 
imposed on firms under a flexible regime are less than under a no-corruption 
regime, that is: 
c sc FC FC 〉  
We can see from the comparison of the first terms of both these expressions 
that when η equals zero, the first term of (FCc) is always greater than that of (FCsc) 
as in section 2. Comparing the second terms of these expressions also gives the 
same results as in part 2: firms dealing with type 2 bureaucrats pay their full tax 
obligations as well as discretionary cost c2. 
 
In Figure 4, we examine diagrammatically the effects of firm bargaining 
power η on bribe amounts and tax revenues. The Effect of Fiscal Policy and Corruption Control Mechanisms on 
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FIGURE 4: BRIBE DEMAND AND OFFER UNDER THE NO-CORRUPTION AND FLEXIBLE 
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We note in Figure 4 that, under a no-corruption regime (τ1, p1), the 
opportunity cost for both employees is P1  and no opportunity for corruption is 
created as neither type 1 nor type 2 bureaucrats have an incentive to be dishonest. 
Indeed, the opportunity cost for type 1 bureaucrats is at P1 while the firm’s bribe 
offer is T1+c1. Hence, no corruption is created as the bribe offer by firms facing type 
2 bureaucrats is even lower (i.e. T1+c2) and the minimum bribe that would be 
accepted by the type 2 bureaucrat is also at P1. When government chooses a 
flexible fiscal regime (τ2, p2), room for corruption is created since the bureaucrat’s 
opportunity cost is at P2. However, we can see that, in order to keep type 1 
bureaucrats honest, the opportunity cost should have been set at a level 
corresponding to Bmax. Indeed, it can be seen that along the firm’s bribe offer curve 
(B= T + c1), Bmin corresponds to the minimum amount of bribe a type 1 bureaucrat is 
willing to receive given the opportunity cost
10 while Bmax corresponds to the 
                                                           
10 Note that Bmin also corresponds to p2w/(1-p2) in Figure 3. The Effect of Fiscal Policy and Corruption Control Mechanisms on 
Firm Growth and Social Welfare: Theory and Evidence 
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maximum amount a firm is willing to pay
11. We also note that firms with full 
bargaining power matched with type 1 bureaucrats pay Bmin, which is smaller than 
T1 + c1 (the amount of tax plus red tape cost a firm would have to pay under a no-
corruption regime). This means that under a flexible fiscal regime (τ2, p2), firms that 
deal with type 1 bureaucrats and have sufficient bargaining power can potentially 
reduce their tax obligations by paying a bribe smaller than the level of their fiscal 
obligations (T1+c1) under the no-corruption regime. This corresponds to segment 
Bmin to T1 + c1 in Figure 4 and leads to the following corollary (proof in the 
Appendix): 
 
COROLLARY OF PROPOSITION 3: Under a fiscal regime allowing for some level 
of corruption, the amount of bribe paid by firms with bargaining power greater than 
η* is lower than the amount of taxes and red tape costs under a no-corruption 
regime. 
 
Lose-lose versus Win-win Policy 
 
  It is often observed that governments in developing countries tend to 
establish very complex tax regimes, but only achieve very low tax collection levels. 
This occurs despite high tax rates due to tax evasion and exemptions (Gauthier and 
Gersovitz, 1997; Gauthier and Reinikka, 2001). The constraint on government 
activities caused by low tax revenues could be explained by a combination of low 
probability of detection, low wage levels and high tax rates that encourage 
corruption activities. Our simple framework allows us to illustrate such a situation.  
 
  Imagine a situation in which the government has set a tax rate that is too 
high relative to its corruption detection policy and in which a very high level of 
corruption will be observed. In such a case, firms have an incentive to pay bribes 
and evade taxation while bureaucrats facing a low probability of being caught 
accepting bribes will tend to be corrupt. We could refer to this policy regime as a 
lose-lose situation 
 
                                                           
11 Bmax also corresponds to T2+c1 in Figure 3. The Effect of Fiscal Policy and Corruption Control Mechanisms on 
Firm Growth and Social Welfare: Theory and Evidence 
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  The rationale for observing such a policy regime in a developing country 
could relate to a situation where government wants to save on monitoring expenses 
while forcing its employees to raise supplementary wages through corruption. Gang 
and al. (1988) noted the issue by asking: “If public workers suffer discrimination by 
wage, why is it then that demand for such jobs stays high?” Lindauer and al. (1988) 
also noted, in the case of Uganda, that “civil workers either survived by diminishing 
their ethical standards or perished in uprightness.”  
 
  It could be argued that in such a lose-lose situation, with firms facing a very 
high level of bribe payments and governments facing very low tax revenues, both 
will gain through a reduction in the tax rate. The first part of our next proposition 
establishes conditions for a lose-lose situation and the second part, conditions for a 
win-win situation. 
 
PROPOSITION 4a: Given a fixed proportion of corrupt bureaucrats of type 1, π1 , 
there may be an inefficient (lose-lose) fiscal policy for which the government sets a 
fiscal policy (τ2l-l , p1)  for which tax rateτ2 commands a detection rate that is higher 
than p1. We thus observe a situation in which both types of bureaucrats are corrupt. 









2 ) 1 (
−
−
〉 − τ  
 
Proof: Figure 5 illustrates the situation. As observed, when p1 is lower than p2, the 
firm bribe offer will be greater than the bureaucrat demand for bribes corresponding 
to their opportunity cost. Thus, the government loses all its tax revenues since both 
types of bureaucrats are corrupt. 
 
A firm with no bargaining power dealing with type 2 bureaucrats will offer a 
bribe up to B
2
max l-l= T2 l-l+c2 while a type 2 bureaucrat dealing with a firm that has full 
bargaining power will accept to lower a bribe down to P1 which is equivalent to B
2
min 
l-l.  The logic is the same for a firm dealing with a type 1 bureaucrat: the firm’s offer 
goes up to B
1
max l-l= T2 l-l+c1 while bribe demand by the bureaucrat remains at P1 
which is equivalent to B
1
min l-l. Note that both types of bureaucrats dealing with firms The Effect of Fiscal Policy and Corruption Control Mechanisms on 
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having full bargaining power receive the same bribe amount since they have the 





T2 w-w+c2 to bureaucrat 1 or 2. 
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PROPOSITION 4b: Under a fixed proportion of corrupt type 1 bureaucrats, π1, there 
may be an efficient (win-win) fiscal policy (τ2w-w, p1) where government  tax revenues 
increase and firm transfers decrease by reducing  tax rate τ2, such that  the 
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Proof:  With the lowering of the tax rate, the opportunity cost of the type 2 
bureaucrat, P1, matches the opportunity cost commanded by τ2w-w. The government 
now earns tax revenues collected by the type 2 bureaucrat, and firms dealing with The Effect of Fiscal Policy and Corruption Control Mechanisms on 
Firm Growth and Social Welfare: Theory and Evidence 
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the bureaucrat now pay a tax amount equal to T2 w-w+c2 which is equivalent to the 
lowest bribe under the lose-lose situation. Firms dealing with type 1 bureaucrats and 
with no bargaining power see their bribe reduced from B
1
max l-l=T2 l-l+c1 to B
1
max w-w 
since above that amount firms prefer to be honest; those with full bargaining power 
see no change in their situation and pay B
1
min w-w= T2 w-w+c2 since the opportunity 
cost of all bureaucrats is still P1. 
 
The conditions in which the optimal negotiating power leads to an optimal tax 
rate are established in Proposition 4 c in the Appendix. 
 
In the next section, we test some of our propositions using firm-level data 
from Uganda. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
The purpose of our empirical analysis is to assess the effects of corruption 
and fiscal policy on tax revenues and firm growth, and test some of the main 
predictions of our theoretical model using firm-level data from Uganda. 
 
Our empirical investigation is divided into two parts. We first assess the 
effect of monitoring activities and firm bargaining power on bribe and tax revenues 
using a simple simultaneous model of bribe and tax payments. We then investigate 




Data are taken from the Ugandan Enterprise survey initiated by the World 
Bank and the Uganda Private Sector Foundation in 1998. In all, 243 firms from five 
economic sectors (commercial agriculture, agro processing, manufacturing, tourism 
and construction) were interviewed on their activities in 1995–1997. The sample 
covers businesses in five geographical areas, namely Kampala, Jinja–Iganga, 
Mbale–Tororo, Mukono and Mbarara. The survey focused on constraints to private 
investments in Uganda. The data include information on investments, exports, The Effect of Fiscal Policy and Corruption Control Mechanisms on 
Firm Growth and Social Welfare: Theory and Evidence 
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infrastructure services, taxation, regulation, and corruption. See Reinikka and 
Svensson (2001) and Svensson (2003) for details. 
 
Taxation data were collected on the main taxes paid by Ugandan 
businesses, in particular the corporate income tax (CIT), the sales tax/value added 
tax (VAT), and the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) levy.
12 Information was 
obtained on the range of special tax reduction and exemption programs available to 
firms within the Ugandan tax system. In addition to special provisions in the general 
Tax Code, one of the main sources of tax exemptions is the 1991 Investment Code, 
which provides exemptions to large investors. The Minister of Finance also grants 
tax exemptions on a case-by-case basis from CIT, import duties, and domestic 
sales taxes. There are no specific rules or criteria for the granting of privileged 
status. (See Gauthier and Reinikka, 2001) 
 
Data on corruption were collected in several parts of the questionnaire. 
Businesses were asked if they usually paid special amounts or bribes to tax and 
customs officers. Information on bribe amounts was obtained indirectly as 
respondents were asked to estimate the typical bribe payments a firm in their line of 




Table 2 presents some basic characteristics of the sample, including age, 
sales, taxes, bribes and ownership using 1997 data. We note the relatively large 
size of firms in the sample, as well as the prevalence of domestic ownership.
14  
 
TABLE 2: BASIC BUSINESS STATISTICS (1997) 
                                                           
12 Other taxes include import duties, the withholding tax, the presumptive tax on small 
businesses; the local property tax, etc. (see Chen and others 2001). 
13 The question was as follows “Many business people have told us that firms are often 
required to make informal payments to public officials to deal with customs, taxes, licenses, 
regulations, services, etc. Can you estimate what a firm in your line of business and of 
similar size and characteristics typically pays each year?” (Svensson, 2003). 
14 Restricting the sample to those firms with a complete series on all variables of interest 
reduces the original sample of 243 businesses by about one-third. Of the remaining 
businesses, those which reported any of the following were eliminated as either data entry 
errors or extreme outliers: tax/sales > 0.25 and bribe/sales > 0.25. 
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 Age  242  13.9  12.5  1  74 
 Number of workers  243  124  259  0  2000 
 Sales  225  2 486  9 499    0.8  89100 
 Tax obligations  153  266  584  0  4 223 
 Tax  153  78  228  0  1 691 
 Tax/sales  153  0.058  0.063  0  0.242 
 Tax/worker  153  1000  3000  0  34 000 
  Bribe  153  7 18 0  164 
 Bribe/sales  153  0.014  0.025  0  0.2 
 Bribe/worker  153  69  126  0    909 
 Foreign–owned  243  24.1  39.5  0  100 
Note: Age is in years in 1997. Workers include permanent and temporary workers. Sales, tax 
obligations, taxes and bribes are in thousands of USD. Tax/sales includes company income 
tax/sales, sales tax VAT/sales and NSSF/sales, and are fractions. Taxes and bribes per 
worker are in USD. Bribes/sales and foreign owned are fractions. 
 
Roughly 72% of the sample firms reported paying bribes. Of these, 40% said 
they did so to reduce tax obligations, and 63% to accelerate services. In the tourism 
sector, close to 82% of businesses reported paying bribes, compared with only 39% 
in the agriculture sector. Average bribe amounts were US  $6720. The highest 
average bribe amounts were observed in the agro processing sector (US $13443) 
and the lowest in agriculture (US $1047). In addition to the nature of government 
services, these differences reflect differences in firm size and ownership structure 
among sectors. The bribes represent 2.4% of sales value. Firms in the agro 
processing sector reported the highest bribe ratio with 6% of sales value, while the 
lowest ratio was reported in the agriculture sector (0.6%). 
 
In terms of firm size, it is interesting to note that the burden of bribe 
extraction by public officials, which falls in absolute terms on larger firms, is in fact 
heavier for medium–sized firms, which pay larger bribes. Indeed, in terms of the 
ratio of bribe payments to sales value and the ratio of bribe payments per worker, 
medium–sized firms pay more, at 3.0% of sales for the 6–30 employee category. The Effect of Fiscal Policy and Corruption Control Mechanisms on 
Firm Growth and Social Welfare: Theory and Evidence 
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A. Monitoring  Activities 
 
  We first investigate the effect of monitoring activities and firm negotiating 
power on bribe payments and tax revenues. We make use of a simple empirical 
model of firm determination of bribe and tax payments. Bribe payments (BRIBE) can 
be postulated as a function of official tax obligations (TAXOBL), actual tax payment 
(TAX), monitoring activities by the tax administration (VERIF), sunk cost (SUNK), 
the firm’s use of government services (GVT), and the firm’s age (AGE), sectors 
(SEC) and location (LOC). Simultaneously, actual tax payment (TAX) is a function of 
official tax obligations (TAXOBL), bribe payments (BRIBE), profit level (PROFIT), 
sunk cost (SUNK), monitoring activities by the tax administration (VERIF), 
ownership (OWN) and location (LOC). More specifically, the model can be written 
as a system of two equations: 
 
(6) BRIBE = β0 + β1TAXOBL + β2TAX + β3VERIF+ β4SUNK + β5GVT + β6AGE  
+ β7SEC + β8LOC + ε1 
 
(7) TAX = δ0 + δ1TAXOBL + δ2 BRIBE + δ4VERIF + δ5SUNK + δ3PROFIT + δ6OWN  
+ β7SEC + β8LOC + ε2 
 
The bribe variable (BRIBE) is the reported bribe payments per employee. 
The official tax obligation variable (TAXOBL) is the amount of tax obligation per 
employee. Our definition of tax obligation is based on the sample firms’ own 
declaration of tax exemptions and characteristics, and the Uganda tax code.
15 The 
                                                           
15 Specifically, for 1997 data, we examined specific exemptions under the general tax code 
and special tax exemptions. We took into account the specific exemptions of the general tax 
code concerning the three main tax collected (CIT, VAT and NSSF), as well as the 
exemptions granted under the various regimes of the 1991 Investment Code. (See Gauthier 
and Reinikka, 2001 for further details). The Effect of Fiscal Policy and Corruption Control Mechanisms on 
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tax variable (TAX) is the ratio of tax payment per employee. The dummy variable 
VERIF takes the value of one if firms report at least one of two tax audits by the tax 
administration (corporate tax and VAT) during the year. The SUNK variable is the 
ratio of firm replacement value and resale value of plant and equipment per 
employee. It denotes the importance of sunk cost for the firm and is a proxy for the 
firm’s capital immobility. The variable profit (PROFIT) is the ratio of profits per 
employee. The variable (GVT) is an index which varies from one to five, accounting 
for a firm’s use of government services (water, electricity, waste disposal, telephone 
and roads). The age variable (AGE) is the log of the age of the firm. TAXINDEX is 
an index of tax payments that accounts for which taxes a firm pays. Tables A1 and 
Table A2 in the Appendix present a detailed description of the variables along with 
summary statistics. 
 
  The system of equations contains endogenous variables among the 
explanatory variables violating the standard assumptions of OLS. Furthermore, the 
error terms across equations are likely to be correlated. Such correlation represents 
the effects of unmeasured factors on bribe and tax payments. 
 
  In order to deal with these issues, we use a three-stage least-squares 
approach (3SLS) to produce consistent estimates, which makes use of generalized 






The three-stage least-squares regression results from the simultaneous 
estimation of equations (6) and (7) are presented in Table 3. The first column 
presents the estimated coefficients for bribe payments, while the second lists the 
estimated coefficients for tax payments.
17 
                                                           
16 The procedure iterates over the estimated disturbance covariance matrix and parameter 
estimates until the parameter estimates converge. Under seemingly unrelated regression, 
the procedure converges to the maximum likelihood estimates. For more details about the 
3SLS procedure, see Greene (2003), pp. 405-407. 
17 An endogeneity test was conducted using a Hausman test, as described in Gujarati 
(1995). The test yields a significant coefficient for the predicted residuals (b = -6.743, σ = The Effect of Fiscal Policy and Corruption Control Mechanisms on 
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We observe that the coefficient for the official tax obligations variable in 
equation (6) is positive (significant at the 1 percent level). This result suggests that, 
as expected, higher tax obligations increase bribe payments. Furthermore, the 
coefficient for actual tax payment is negative (significant at the 10 percent level), 
indicating that, as hypothesized, graft payments decrease with tax payments. 
 
We also note that the coefficient of the variable accounting for monitoring 
activities (VERIF) is negative as expected (significant at the 5 percent level), 
suggesting that bribe payments decrease with increased monitoring. This result 
supports proposition 4 and is consistent with the stylized facts presented in Basu 
and Mishra (1992), namely that it is useful for the government to increase 
monitoring activities as it reduces corruption activities. 
 
The SUNK variable accounting for firm sunk costs and a proxy of firm 
bargaining power has, as expected, a positive coefficient (significant at the 5 
percent level). This suggest that, as hypothesised in proposition 3, firms with 
important sunk costs in plant and equipment have less bargaining power and are 
more inclined to pay higher bribes to public officials than firms with lower sunk 
costs. The AGE variable shows a negative and significant coefficient, suggesting 
that older firms might be better established than younger ones and are thus able to 
reduce their bribe payments to public officials. Finally, the coefficient of the variable 
accounting for the use of public services (GVT) is positive (significant at the 1 
percent level), indicating that graft payments increase with the use of public 
infrastructure and thus increased contacts with government officials. 
 
TABLE 3: DETERMINANTS OF BRIBE AND TAX PAYMENTS 
3SLS ESTIMATION 
SPECIFICATION (1) SPECIFICATION (2) 
VARIABLES 
BRIBE T AX B RIBE T AX 
BRIBE  –9.1327*    –10.0444**
                                                                                                                                                                    
3.651;        t = -1.85, P>t: 0.067), indicating that the hypothesis of simultaneity could not be 
rejected. 
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2  0.3132 0.7300 0.3460  0.7124 
Χ
2  59.18 393.81  65.30  343.13 
p-value  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
Number of 
observations 
141 141 131  131 
Note: N is the number of observations. The figures in parentheses are z-statistics. 
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level, ** Statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level. *** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Χ
2 test and corresponding p-value that 
the coefficients in the equation are jointly equal to zero. 
The second column in Table 3 shows the determinants of tax payment. We 
observe that the coefficient for the official tax obligations variable in equation (7) is 
positive (significant at the 1 percent level). This suggests that, as expected, higher 
official tax obligations are associated with higher tax payments.  Furthermore, we 
also note that the coefficient for bribe payments is negative (significant at the 5 
percent level) indicating that, as hypothesized, higher bribes are associated with 
lower tax payments. We also note that the coefficient of the variable profit ratio is The Effect of Fiscal Policy and Corruption Control Mechanisms on 
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negative (significant at the 1 percent level), suggesting that a higher profit rate leads 
to higher tax evasion. 
 
These results support propositions 3 and 4, that bribe and tax payments are 
responsive to fiscal policies and detection mechanisms. In particular, our results 
suggest that monitoring activities are useful in the sense that they increase 
government tax revenues and reduce bribery activities. Furthermore, these results 
indicate that bureaucrats’ capacity to extract bribes decreases with firms’ bargaining 
power associated with increased mobility and more government contacts. 
 
B.  Effects of Tax and Bribery Rates on Firm Growth 
 
We now investigate the effect of tax and corruption activities on firm growth. 
As stated in Proposition 4, a fiscal regime could be such that tax levels and bribe 
payments are high, leading to low tax revenues. In such a situation, firms and 
government are negatively affected and both could gain from a reduction in tax 
levels and bribe payments. We will compare the effect of observed corruption on 
firm growth with that of anticipated corruption by a myopic government. Following 
Fisman and Svensson (2002), we utilize the following basic formulation: 
 
(8) GROWTH = β0 + β1 BRIBE + β2 TAX + β3 TAXOBL + β4SALES0 + β5 AGE + 
β6OWN +β7TAXINDEX + β8SEC + β9LOC + ε1 
 
where GROWTH is the rate of growth of employment during the 1995-97 period, 
BRIBE is the ratio of the bribe amount per employee, TAX is the ratio of tax per 
employee, TAXOBL is the amount of tax obligation per employee. SALES0 
represents initial sales, AGE is the log of the firm’s age, OWN is a dummy to 
account for the effect of foreign ownership, and TAXINDEX is an index of tax 
payments that accounts for which taxes a firm pays. Tables A1 and A2 in the 
Appendix present a detailed description of the variables along with summary 
statistics. 
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Initial sales are introduced to control for initial firm size. Age could be linked 
to growth of employment, in that younger firms may tend to grow more quickly than 
older and more established firm. Origin of capital ownership could be linked to 
access to technology and financial resources. However, access to bureaucrats 
could vary with ownership as foreign owned firms might be subject to more 
harassment from government officials. We also control for the specific effects of 
location and industry, since there may be a difference in technology and demand 
shocks among sectors and local markets. 
 
Our theoretical framework suggests that the process driving bribe and tax 
payments is a function of factors associated with contacts between firms and 
bureaucrats and respective negotiating power. Bribe and tax amounts in our model 
are therefore endogenous and are seen as determined by a negotiation process 
taking place between firms and bureaucrats, as examined in section 4A. Bribe and 
tax payments could be seen as being influenced by the degree of contacts between 
firms and bureaucrats and the leverage bureaucrats are able to exercise over firms. 
The model can then be written as a system of three equations (6), (7) and (8), as 
described above.  
 
  Given that the system of simultaneous equations contains endogenous 
variables among the explanatory variables, we use a three-stage least-squares 
approach (3SLS) to produce consistent estimates that account for the correlation 
structure in the disturbances across equations.  
 
The simultaneous equation model will be compared to the effects of 
corruption of firm growth anticipated by a myopic government. Such a myopic 
government could be seen as simply estimating the effect of bribes and taxes on 
firm growth without taking into account the endogenous relationship between bribes, 
tax levels and growth. Comparing these estimates between a non-myopic and 
myopic government could be revelatory of the potential gains associated with 
reforms of fiscal and corruption control policies. 
 
Results The Effect of Fiscal Policy and Corruption Control Mechanisms on 
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As a starting point, the growth regression (8) is estimated using a simple 
OLS. The regression results for two different specifications are presented in Table
 4. 
All regressions are run using a Huber-White correction for heteroskedasticity. 
 
In both Table 4 specifications, we observe that the coefficients on bribe and 
tax ratios are not significant at a 10 percent level. This suggests that a myopic 
government would not be able to infer the potential negative effects of corruption 
activities on firm growth.  
 
The growth regression (8) is then estimated using a 3SLS in which bribes 
and taxes are instrumented using equations (6) and (7). The results are presented 
in Table 5. The first column sets out the estimated coefficients for firm growth 
(Equation 8), while the second and third columns list the estimated coefficient for 
bribes (Equation 6) and taxes (Equation 7). 
 
Controlling for profit rates, sector and location, we observe that the bribe and 
tax level coefficients in equation (8) are negative as expected and significant (at the 
1 percent and 5 percent level). Furthermore, the tax obligation coefficient is positive 
as expected (significant at the 5 percent level), since a higher tax obligation is 
associated with better performing firms. 
 
We thus observe that once we account for endogeneity in the growth 
regression, the negative effect of bribe and tax ratios on growth are both significant. 
It is also interesting to note the magnitude of the negative effect of bribes and taxes 
on growth. The negative effect of bribes on growth is much larger, being twice as 
great as that of taxes. 
 
We also note that the coefficient for firm age is negative and significant (at 
the 1 percent level), indicating as expected that that growth of employment is 
associated with younger firms. We also note that firm growth is significantly greater 
among foreign-owned firms compared to domestic-owned firms. Furthermore, firms The Effect of Fiscal Policy and Corruption Control Mechanisms on 
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located in the capital, Kampala, tend to grow significantly more than firms located in 
other regions. 
 
TABLE 4: DETERMINANTS OF FIRM GROWTH: OLS ESTIMATION 





























SECTOR   -.0335** 
(-1.96) 







2 0.073  0.190 
N 128  128 
Note: N is the number of observations. The figures in parentheses are t-statistics. All 
regressions allow for clustering by industry–location and use Hubert-White correction 
for heteroskedasticity * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level, ** Statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level. *** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
 
TABLE 5: DETERMINANT OF FIRM GROWTH, BRIBE AND TAX PAYMENTS 
3SLS ESTIMATION 





TAX –.00002***  –.0075*   The Effect of Fiscal Policy and Corruption Control Mechanisms on 
Firm Growth and Social Welfare: Theory and Evidence 
 
  
Copyright © HEC Montréal 
32 
(–2.47) (–1.83) 


















TAX INDEX  .0928** 
(2.09) 
  








GVT   23.1036*** 
(2.58) 
 





















2 –0.0999  0.3737  0.7344 
Χ
2  38.62 69.76  332.32 
p-value 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Number of observations  116  116  116 
Note: N is the number of observations. The figures in parentheses are z-statistics. *  Statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level, **  Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. ***  Statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. Χ
2 test and corresponding p-value that the coefficients in the equation 
are jointly equal to zero. 
 
 
The estimated coefficients for the bribe equation (6) and tax equation (7) 
presented in the second and third columns of Table 5 are consistent with the results 
presented in Table 3. Firms face the trade-off of paying taxes and bribes, as 
increased graft payments decrease tax payments and vice-versa.  In the bargaining 
process between firms and public officials, less mobile firms and those requiring The Effect of Fiscal Policy and Corruption Control Mechanisms on 
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more government services for their activities have a lower bargaining power and pay 
higher bribes. Ultimately, they grow more slowly. 
 
These results support Proposition 4 that the fiscal policy of a myopic 
government would underestimate the negative effects of bribery on growth (as 
modelled by a standard OLS) and would set too low a detection rate with respect to 
official tax rates. On the other hand, the fiscal policy of a non-myopic government 
would take into account the real negative effects of bribery on firm growth (by 
accounting for the endogeneity of bribery on growth) and would increase the 




As a robustness check, given the truncated nature of the bribe variable, we 
use a Tobit model to estimate bribe payments. The model takes the form:  
 
(6a) BRIBE*  =  β0 + β1TAXOBL + β2TAX + β3VERIF+ β4SUNK + β5GVT + β6AGE  
+ β7SEC + β8LOC + ε1 
 
(6b)  BRIBE = max (0, BRIBE*) 
 
where BRIBE*, the latent variable, is the ratio of reported bribes per 
employee and the other variables are as defined above. In the first stage, we 
estimate bribe rates using (6a–b) while tax rates are estimated with an OLS using 
(7). The results are presented in Tables 7 and 8. In the second stage, these 
estimates are used as instruments in the growth equation (5). As shown in Table 6, 
this approach yields the same qualitative results. The impact of bribes and taxes are 
significant and negative in the growth regression. 
 
TABLE 6: ROBUSTNESS: DETERMINANTS OF FIRM GROWTH: 
OLS ESTIMATION WITH BRIBES AND TAXES AS AN INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES 
VARIABLES S PECIFICATION 
BRIBE –.0008* The Effect of Fiscal Policy and Corruption Control Mechanisms on 
Firm Growth and Social Welfare: Theory and Evidence 
 
  























Number of observations  116 
Note: N is the number of observations. The figures in parentheses are t-statistics. *  Statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level, **  Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. ***  Statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level.  
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TABLE 7: ROBUSTNESS: DETERMINANTS OF BRIBE PAYMENTS: 
TOBIT ESTIMATES – DEPENDENT VARIABLE: BRIBES PER EMPLOYEE 
VARIABLES S PECIFICATION 
TAX –.0100*** 
(–2.65) 


















Number of observations  132 
Note: N is the number of observations. The figures in parentheses are z-statistics. *  Statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level, **  Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. ***  Statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level.  
 The Effect of Fiscal Policy and Corruption Control Mechanisms on 
Firm Growth and Social Welfare: Theory and Evidence 
 
  
Copyright © HEC Montréal 
36 
 
TABLE 8: ROBUSTNESS: DETERMINANTS OF TAX PAYMENTS 
VARIABLES S PECIFICATION 
BRIBE –3.7881** 
(–2.33) 




















Number of observations  135 
Note: N is the number of observations. The figures in parentheses are z-statistics. *  Statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level, **  Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. ***  Statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
 
As a further robustness check, we also used rate of sales growth instead of 
employment growth to measure firm growth. We use bribe and tax amounts and 
control for size. Regressions yield the same qualitative results as shown in Table 8. 
The impact of bribes and taxes are negative and significant in the growth The Effect of Fiscal Policy and Corruption Control Mechanisms on 
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regression. Even so, the negative effect of bribes on growth is much greater than 
that of taxes. 
TABLE 9: ROBUSTNESS: DETERMINANT OF FIRM GROWTH (SALES), 
BRIBE AND TAX PAYMENTS: 3SLS ESTIMATION 
















MOBILITY   181.5369 
(0.69) 
 














































2 –16.1612  0.0067  –0.0624 
Χ
2  69.39 27.36 45.01 
p-value 0.0000  0.0012  0.0000 
Number of observations  117  117  117 
Note: N is the number of observations. The figures in parentheses are z-statistics. *  Statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level, **  Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. ***  Statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. Χ
2 test and corresponding p-value that the coefficients in the equation 
are jointly equal to zero. The Effect of Fiscal Policy and Corruption Control Mechanisms on 
Firm Growth and Social Welfare: Theory and Evidence 
 
  




The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between tax levels 
and corruption activities. We develop a simple model to analyze the conflict 
between a government, bureaucrats and private firms in the context of the tax 
collection process. 
 
We first model a situation where bureaucrats are homogeneous and have 
complete negotiating power over the firms with which they interact. We show that in 
such a situation the government can set an optimal tax rate and put in place 
corruption control mechanisms involving incentive wages and detection in the 
framework of a no-corruption equilibrium. However, when the public administration 
is composed of heterogeneous types of bureaucrats with the specific capacity to 
impose red tape costs on firms, we show, like Acemoglu and Verdier (2000), that it 
might be best for the government to allow a certain level of corruption given the cost 
of monitoring activities. 
 
We show in particular that net government revenues are maximized under a 
fiscal regime with some level of corruption activity. We also show that the 
government could face lose-lose as well as win-win situations in the conduct of its 
fiscal policies. 
 
We test the predictions of the model using firm-level data from Uganda. In 
particular, we examine the effect of monitoring activities and firm bargaining power 
on bribe payments and tax revenues. We also test the effect of bribe and tax rates 
on firm growth. Our results are robust and indicate that bribe payments tend to 
significantly reduce tax payments by firms. We also show that bribery activities 
increase with firm immobility but that monitoring activities seem to be effective in 
reducing bribe payments. Also, our results indicate that a myopic government that 
does not take into account the actual importance of bribery activities would 
underestimate the negative effect of corruption on firm growth. Graft activity has a 
negative effect on growth at the firm level, both in terms of employment and sales. 
This effect is much greater than that of tax (ten times greater). The Effect of Fiscal Policy and Corruption Control Mechanisms on 
Firm Growth and Social Welfare: Theory and Evidence 
 
  




PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1: 
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We calculate the critical proportion of type 1 bureaucrats yielding higher net 
revenues under a flexible regime than under a no-corruption regime: 
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Substituting,  () 2
1
1 1 π − = x  et  ( ) 1
2 1 π − = x  
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: 
 
Social costs under the no-corruption regime (SCsc) are:
18 
( ) 1 2 1 1 1 1 p c c SCsc α π π + − + =   
While social costs under the flexible regime (SCc) are: 
() 2 2 1 1 p c SCc α π + − =  
Comparing these costs, we have: 
c sc SC SC 〉  
⇔  ( ) 1 2 1 1 1 1 p c c α π π + − + >   2 2 1) 1 ( p c α π + −
⇔  >   1 1 1 p c α π + 2 p α
This inequality always holds since p1 > p2. Social costs are thus lower under 




Let us turn now to the costs imposed on firms (FCsc) under these two fiscal 
regimes. Under the no-corruption regime, firm costs are: 
                                                           
18 Net of tax transfers to the government and to corrupt bureaucrats. The Effect of Fiscal Policy and Corruption Control Mechanisms on 
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( ) ( )( ) 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 c T c T FCsc + − + + = π π  
 
Costs imposed on firms (FCc) under the flexible regime are: 
() ( ) 2 2 1 1 1 c T B FCc + − + = π π  where    ) ( 1 2 c T B + =
Comparing these costs, we have: 
c sc FC FC 〉  
If we compare the first term of each equation, we note that: 
( ) ( ) 1 2 1 1 1 1 c T c T + 〈 + π π  
While for the second term, we have: 
() ( ) ( )( ) 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 c T c T + − 〈 + − π π  
This implies that the costs imposed on firms are higher under the flexible 
regime. Hence, while the flexible regime yields higher net tax revenues and lower 
social costs than the no-corruption regime, we see that the costs imposed on firms 
are greater under the flexible regime than under the no-corruption regime. Under the 
flexible regime, corrupt firms pay bribes equal to T2+c1 to type 1 bureaucrats, while 
honest firms pay higher tax transfers (i.e. τ2 > τ1). 
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19 A normative analysis of social costs is also available upon request. The Effect of Fiscal Policy and Corruption Control Mechanisms on 
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From first order conditions, we get: 
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Which yields the following relationship: 
(9)  () () ( c T
p
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PROOF OF COROLLARY 3: DERIVATION OF CRITICAL BARGAINNING 
POWER η* 
 
To obtain firms’ costs that are lower when a government chooses a flexible fiscal 
regime, we need:  
c sc FC FC 〉  
 
⇔    () () (1 1 1 2 1 1 1 c T c T + + + − π π
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Hence, η>η* to have   c sc FC FC 〉
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Under a fixed proportion π1  of corrupt type 1 bureaucrats, there may be an 
efficient fiscal policy (τ2l-w, p1) that we call lose-win where the government sees its 
tax revenues decrease and firms see their transfers decrease by reducing the tax 
rate,τ2, in order to keep all bureaucrats opportunity cost under P1. In such 









2 ) 1 (
−
−
〈 − τ  
Proof: 
 Given  (τ2l-w, p1), the opportunity cost of both types of bureaucrats is now at P2 
l-w in Figure (5a). The Government’s tax revenues from bureaucrat 2 decline from 
T2w-w+c2 to T2l-w+c2. However, the situation is to the advantage of firms dealing with 
type 1 bureaucrats since the lowering of the bureaucrats’ opportunity cost has the 
effect of lowering the minimal bribe a bureaucrat is willing to accept. In Figure (5a), 
there is a range (brace Al-w) where firms with sufficient bargaining power can lower 
their bribe to an amount smaller than what they would have paid in fiscal obligations 
under a no-corruption policy T1+c1. We also note that Bmin l-w is effectively smaller 
than Bmin w-w= T1+c1. 
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Corollary to Proposition 4c 
 
There is an optimal tax rate τ2
** set accordingly to η* (eq.9) for which gains 
made by firms dealing with corrupt type 1 bureaucrats make up for the government’s 





2 1 * 1 1 *
1
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Proof: By comparing the effect of the flexible policy and the no-corruption policy on 
firm cost we obtained a critical bargaining power η* (eq.9). Transforming this 
equation and isolating τ2
** yields the optimal tax rate under which firms dealing with 
corrupt bureaucrats minimize their bribes while the government still collects higher 
tax revenues with a flexible policy than with a no-corruption policy. 
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TABLE A1: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF VARIABLES 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev. 
Age 242  12.9  12.5 
Employment 1997  243  124  259 
Employment 1995  213  103  251 
Sales 1997  225  2.486  9.499   
Sales 1995  197  1.669  6.180 
Growth (of sales)  189  0.111  0.347 
Growth (of employment)  208  0.054  0.257 
Tax obligations/sales  164  0.163  0.116 
Tax/sales 164  0.076  0.092 
Bribe/sales 164  0.013  0.024 
Tax obligations/worker  164  2882  5422 
Tax/worker 164  1355  4262 
Bribe/worker 164  69  126 
Profit 219  590364  5028967 
Profit / worker  219  3455  12821 
Resale value  219  6359  12375 
Sunk cost  220  15997  33321 
Foreign Ownership  243  24.1  39.5 
Exchange 241  0.510  .501 
Taxindex 233  1.183  .574 
Servgvt 243  3.474  1.292 
Verification 229  1.677  0.469 
 
Note: Means and standard errors are given in USD. 
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TABLE A2: VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
 
AGE: ln(firm’s age); 
 
BRIBE: Bribe amount divided by number of employees in 1997; 
 
EMPLOYMENT97: Total employment in firm in1997; 
 
EMPLOYMENT95: Total employment in firm in1995; 
 
EVA: Binary variable taking value of 1 if a firm has evaded both taxes (corporate tax 
and VAT) and 0 if a firm has not; 
 
EXEMP: Index from 0 to 2 indicating exemptions from corporate tax and import 
duties (exemption=0 if no exemptions, 1 if partial exemptions, and 2 if full 
exemptions); 
 
GROWTH: Growth of employment calculated as follows: (ln(EMP97) – 
ln(EMP95))/2; 
 
GROWTH (SALES): growth of sales calculated as follows: (ln(sales97) – 
ln(sales95))/2; 
 
GVT: Index from 0 to 5 for availability of public services. The index is the sum of five 
dummy variables that indicate whether electricity, water, waste services, roads and 
telephones are available. The dummy variables take the value 1 if a service is 
available, 0 otherwise; 
 
LOC: Index taking a value of 1- 5 depending on the firm’s sector of activity 
(Kampala, Jinja–Iganga, Mbale–Tororo, Mukono or Mbarara); 
 
OWN: Percentage of foreign ownership of the firm; 
 




SALES97: Amount of sales in 1997; 
 
SEC: Index taking a value of 1- 5 depending on the sector of activity of the firm 
(commercial agriculture, agro processing, manufacturing, tourism or construction); 
 
SUNK: Capital immobility measured as the ratio of the firm’s replacement value over 
the resale value of plant and equipment; 
 
TAXINDEX: Log of (1+ Tax index); 
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Tax index: Index of types of taxes paid by a firm. The index is the sum of six 
dummy variables indicating which taxes a firm pays. A dummy is equal to 1 if the 
firm pays the tax, 0 otherwise. Taxes in Uganda are import duty, import commission, 
withholding tax, excise tax, VAT and corporate tax; 
 
TAX: Taxes per employees in 1997; 
 
TAXOBL:  Expected tax obligations per employees in 1997; 
 
UBRIBE: Amounts of bribe payments in $US in 1997; 
 
UTAX: Amount of tax payments in $US in 1997; 
 
UTAXOBL: Amount of anticipated tax obligations in $US in 1997; 
 
VERIF: Binary variable taking a value of 1 if a firm was audited for both taxes 
(corporate tax and VAT) and 0 if a firm was not audited. 
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